Turnbull Services LLC, SRL, TOB
UAS & Interceptor Drones
Ukrainian interceptors that already work. Manufacturing outside Ukraine. Turnbull and its partners in the middle.
The requirement is already here
Anyone who wants to build Ukrainian drones is not buying a concept. They are buying a product class that is already flying every night, already killing incoming strike UAVs, and already being scaled because missiles cannot win the cost fight. If you are still building drones designed more than a year ago, you are already obsolete.
Russia launched more than 8,000 Shahed-type UAVs in May 2026 alone, on the order of 250 a day. Ukrainian officials put Russian Shahed production above 400 a day. The mix is no longer only the slow propeller Shahed. Jet-powered variants (Geran-3, Geran-4, and related types) are in the raids: 300 to 550 km/h class, some nights dozens in a single wave, harder for last-kilometer FPV interceptors to catch. That is why the next production line has to include faster interceptors and better software, not a copy of last year’s airframe.
A Patriot round still costs about $3 million. A Ukrainian interceptor drone costs $3,000 to $5,000. President Zelenskyy has put average interceptor success above 60 percent. Ukraine’s air force says interceptors now account for one in three aerial kills, and more than 70 percent of Shahed shoot-downs over Kyiv in February 2026. Ukraine has talked about more than 2,000 interceptors a day of production. NATO Allies have pledged more than $40 billion for counter-drone capability over five years. The shortage of combat-proven interceptors is worldwide. That is the opening Turnbull and its partners are built to fill.
Figures are public Ukrainian and allied reporting, 2025–2026. They describe the market, not a Turnbull-owned system.
This is not only a battlefield problem
These airframes and this software will not stay on the Ukrainian front. Production at this scale proliferates. The same cheap one-way attack drone that hits a substation in Kharkiv can be pointed at an airport, a port, a power plant, or a city in Europe or the United States. Airport closures from drone incursions are already routine in Europe. In 2026, European airports have halted traffic over drone sightings; one German airport recovered a small drone carrying explosives. Fiber-optic and autonomous strike drones are no longer rare.
The next mass-casualty attack may not be a hijacked airliner. It may be cheap, attritable drones against civilians and critical infrastructure. Interceptors that already work against Shaheds and jet-powered variants are the practical answer for cities, airports, energy sites, and bases, not only for the front line. That is a second market, and it is why volume production in Europe matters.
What the industrial partner actually gets
Turnbull, with its partners, takes combat-proven Ukrainian UAS and stands up manufacturing outside Ukraine, in Europe or elsewhere as the investment requires. Investors and industrial partners use us for manufacturer access, due diligence, legal structure, and the plant. We represent multiple Ukrainian drone companies whose systems are combat-proven, and we work with Romanian industry on the production side. We do not list manufacturers on a public page.
Access to real manufacturers
Nearly three years in this sector, including factory and company visits in Kharkiv and Kyiv, plus Romanian industry for production in Europe.
Technical due diligence
Which airframes, sensors, and software are in serial production, including against jet-powered Shahed-class UAVs, and which plants can actually export that know-how.
A factory outside Ukraine
Not a U.S.-only story and not Europe-only. Production where investors can insure, visit, and export. Romania is a strong option: EU law, Schengen, Black Sea ports, and our headquarters in Constanța next to Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base. Other locations as the deal requires.
One contracting vehicle
Turnbull Services LLC (certified SDVOSB) for U.S. capital and U.S. government work. SRL in Romania and TOB in Ukraine so the work is performed by companies that already exist under local law. U.S., European, and Ukrainian paper, one partner.
Software and AI targeting
Detection, classification, and targeting software from companies that have already run this loop under fire. Autonomy at scale, with a human in the loop who can authorize or abort. Attributable control for military and civil use.
The wrap around the line
Security, logistics, construction, and site support through the same firm. A drone factory is a security problem, a customs problem, and a labor problem. We already do that work in Romania and Ukraine.
Interceptors, software, and production
Ukrainian interceptor drones exist because a roughly $35,000 Shahed cannot be answered with a $3 million missile every night, and because jet-powered variants close the gap on interceptors that were built for a 180 km/h propeller threat. Kyiv produced about 100,000 interceptors in 2025. Front-line units in late 2025 and early 2026 were receiving on the order of 1,000 to 1,500 interceptors per day. Experienced crews on specific systems report hit rates well above the 60 percent average, including 80–90 percent in published manufacturer and unit figures. Two or three interceptors per incoming UAV is still cheap compared with a missile.
Interceptor airframes
Last-kilometer FPV killers and faster pursuit systems for propeller Shaheds and jet-powered one-way attack UAVs. Serial production, not a prototype video.
Human in the loop
A pilot remains in the shot. Authorize, hold, or abort. Military buyers and civil authorities both need attributable control, not an unsupervised kill chain.
Attritable, at scale
Cheap enough to launch in numbers. Fast enough to rebuild after a night of 200-plus incoming UAVs, or to sit over an airport and a power grid. That is the industrial problem.
How the engagement runs
1. Scope and NDA
What you want to build: interceptors, FPV, software, or a mixed line. We match you to manufacturers we already know, under NDA. No public name list.
2. The plant
We stand up a production line outside Ukraine, at a location the customer chooses. Romania is a strong option because we already operate there. The line is built to combat-proven Ukrainian specifications.
3. Structure the deal
License, joint venture, or contract manufacture. Turnbull can be the contracting vehicle. A Romanian SRL is one option for a European plant, not the only one. Ukrainian TOB where the technology stays close to the fight. U.S. LLC where U.S. capital or U.S. government contracting is part of the deal.
4. Stand up the line in Europe
Site, labor, security, logistics, and construction. Romania is a preferred location because our European headquarters and operating base are already there. We will stand the line up wherever the capital, permits, and industrial fit are sound.